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Abstract: This study examines the consequences of alternative relief and development  interventions on the well
being of households in rural Zimbabwe.  It does so by: a) establishing a framework that links household
resources to levels of poverty; b)  validating the quantitative data with group wealth rankings by the households
in the study; c) estimating key parameters within this framework, namely: the determinants of net crop income;
the determinants of private transfers; and the links between increased  incomes and the accumulation of capital
stock; and d) conducting a counterfactual exercise in which relief assistance is reduced and reallocating these
funds to improve access to agricultural extension and increased holdings of capital stock.  Under these
counterfactuals, the incidence and severity of poverty in non-drought years fall significantly.  The best
performing counterfactual, improving access to extension and increasing capital stock reduces the incidence of
food poverty by 11 per cent.  Under the most basic scenario, the increased income generated by transforming
relief aid into agricultural capital is sufficient to fund an adequate diet for each person in each beneficiary
household for six months.  Further, such improvements in well being are achieved without households
necessarily being made worse off during a drought year.  These results suggest that for the households in this
sample, there is a significant opportunity cost associated with the shift in external aid resources from
development to emergency assistance.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this DFID funded study is to analyse the distributional consequences of
drought  relief and development assistance on rural households.  The intention is to increase
the understanding of the impact of relief and development aid on the poor, with the goal of
improving policy design and implementation.
The last ten years have witnessed an increasing amount of bilateral and multilateral
aid devoted to emergency and distress relief.  For example, approximately 12 per cent of
DFID bilateral aid is now spent on emergency and distress relief compared to about 2 percent
in the mid 1980s.  Between 1991/92 and 1994/95 the average amount of DFID bilateral aid
spent on emergency aid in countries south of the Sahara was 21 percent.  DFID is not the only
development agency experiencing such shifts.  Across all countries reporting to the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), about 10 per cent of DAC bilateral aid went on
emergency relief in the mid-1990s, up from about 3 per cent ten years earlier.  The amount of
aid spent on non-emergency activities has remained broadly unchanged over this period.  The
most spectacular example comes from the World Food Program.  In the mid-1980s, about 80
per cent of WFP assistance was spent on development projects with the remainder being
allocated to emergency relief.  In the mid-1990s, these proportions were reversed (Hoddinott,
1998).
Although these trends have attracted comment (Borton, 1993; Buchanan-Smith and
Maxwell, 1994) and expressions of concern at the donor level (Holden, 1994), the
consequences of this change are poorly understood.  In particular, one might suspect that this
may be at the expense of longer-term development efforts to reduce poverty, undernutrition
and other measures of well being.  To date, the absence of any detailed empirical analysis of
the impact of these changes makes it impossible to determine whether such concerns are
justified.  In this paper, we use the conceptual framework outlined in Hoddinott (1998),
together with a unique four year household panel data set from Zimbabwe to quantify the
opportunity cost - in terms of foregone poverty reduction - of this shift in aid spending.  In
one of the four years of this panel, our surveyed households received drought relief.  We
examine the consequences of reducing the funds allocated to this relief and using the monies
saved to increase both physical and human capital of poor households.  We find that the
incidence and severity of poverty in non-drought years fall significantly.  Further, such
improvements in well being are made without households necessarily being made worse off
during a drought year.
The paper is organised in the following fashion.  In section 2, we briefly outline the
conceptual framework we will use to examine these trade-offs.  Section 3 outlines our data
sources.  In section 4, we explain how these different relationships are estimated.  Section 5
presents our counter-factual simulations and section 6 concludes.
2 . A conceptual framework for examining the impact of changes in the purpose of aid
flows
Our conceptual framework is outlined in Figure 1.  It is surrounded by three frames denoting
the natural, policy and social environment in which the household exists.  Such framing
emphasises that all interventions are situated within a broader environment and that this
environment will have an important impact on the efficacy of any intervention.
Within these environments, consider poverty to be a consequence of an inadequate
asset base (broadly defined) and/or low returns to these assets relative to the goods that the2
poor wish to purchase.  Accordingly, at the top of Figure 1, there are two thickly-lined black
boxes.  The right-hand box represents labour income, obtained by combining labour supply -
defined in terms of both quantity of labour used and the human capital embodied in that
labour - with returns to that labour.  The left-hand box represents capital income, obtained
from combining non-human capital with returns to capital.  These, together with private
transfers (located in the smaller box between these) produce total household income.  One
could disaggregate household income in a number of other ways.  For example, one could
distinguish different sources of income: subsistence cropping; cash cropping; livestock; wage
employment; transfers; and other income sources.  The attraction of the approach used here is
that it makes it relatively straightforward to consider the impact of emergency and
development interventions.
Total household income, together with the set of prices faced by the household,
determines the set of feasible consumption bundles available to the household.  It is all
possible combinations of food, shelter, clothing and other goods that a household could
purchase.  The value of this consumption set can be compared against a defined poverty line. 
If the purchasing power of the household is less than this line, the household is considered
poor.  What the household actually consumes will depend on tastes, knowledge (for example,
knowledge of which foods are most nutritious) and rules regarding how food and other goods
should be distributed within the household.
Next consider the impact of interventions funded by emergency and development
assistance.  The former include: Cash Transfers, Humanitarian & Supplementary Feeding,
School Feeding and Food for Work.  The latter include: Infrastructure, Credit, Land
Resettlement, Agricultural Extension, Business Extension, New Agricultural Technologies,
Ration Shops, Infrastructure and Food Subsidy.  As discussed in Hoddinott (1998), the
dichotomy between emergency and development aid interventions should not be
overemphasised.  Infrastructure development, though denoted here as a "development
intervention" can greatly enhance the efficacy of emergency operations.  Mother and child
health programs are supported by both emergency and development interventions.
These interventions affect household well being through four pathways, by: (a)
directly augmenting households assets - such as those that increase human, physical or
financial capital; (b) increasing the returns to those assets; (c) by increasing incomes without
directly altering either the level or return on endowments; and (d) changing the prices faced
by households as they turn their income into consumption.  All these interventions are placed
above the box denoting the set of feasible consumption bundles.  By doing so, it is possible to
compare how these interventions alter this set and thus determine how they affect the
incidence and severity of poverty.
1
Finally, there are second round or feedback effects, denoted by the dashed black lines
in Figure 1.  Consider the impact of a development aid intervention designed to improve the
provision of agricultural extension.  Through the pathways described above, this should lead
to a better consumption bundle in the sense that either the amount, number or the quality of
goods consumed increases.  But note that decisions regarding actual consumption will affect
                                                          
1. It is worth noting that this schematic diagram is silent on whom within the household should be the recipient of
these interventions.  It has been argued (Alderman et. al., 1995) that this issue is an important factor in the
determining the success of these interventions.  In this diagram, specifying the identity of the recipient does not
affect the impact on the feasible consumption set, but instead would work through the 'intrahousehold allocation
rules' and thus the actual consumption bundle chosen.3
holdings of physical capital via the decision to save some fraction of household income. 
Allocations of food, expenditures on education and health will all affect the level and
distribution of human capital within the household.  These investments have an effect on the
household's ability to generate income subsequently.  But not all these feedback effects are
benign.  The provision of a public transfer, say food aid during a drought, may induce an
offsetting reduction in assistance provided to the household by family or neighbours.
Figure 1 provides a useful organising framework for considering the effects associated
with shifts from spending on development to spending on emergency relief.  It emphasises the
need to understand the magnitudes of the linkages between various interventions and
outcomes of interests.  For example, which interventions generate the largest increases in
incomes?  To what extent is the impact of increased transfers on poverty mitigated by the
reductions in private transfers that they may generate?  To what extent does the achievement
of very immediate goals - such as providing households with incomes during droughts - come
at the expense of the longer-term objectives such as poverty reduction?  Further, Figure 1 is
drawn for a single household.  Shifts in aid from development to emergency assistance may
alter the composition of the pool of beneficiaries.  This could occur in geographical terms -
where, for example, resources are shifted out of support to farmers in a high potential region
and redirected to drought-afflicted households in a low potential area.  If re-allocation occurs
across households of different income or demographic classes, it will affect the distribution of
observed outcomes as well as their levels.
3. The Zimbabwe household panel data set
2
(i) Background
Before we describe our data in detail, it is helpful to have a little knowledge regarding the
history of the households in our sample.  It is well known that access to land has long been an
issue of major economic and political importance in Zimbabwe.  Anger at the gross
disparities in land ownership between blacks and whites was a major factor motivating armed
rebellion against White minority rule.  Upon gaining Independence, the Government of
Zimbabwe committed itself to a wide ranging programme of land reform, designed to redress
these severe inequalities.  A component of the land reform programme was the resettlement
of households on farms previously occupied by white commercial farmers. The supply of land
for resettlement was determined by the availability of areas which had been abandoned during
the liberation war and also the general insecurity of European farmers in peripheral areas who
were willing to sell.  In most cases, these were the commercial farms contiguous or generally
bordering the communal areas.  The majority of land tended to be in the worst agro-ecological
zones, 78 percent of resettlement occurred in zones III, IV and V, and only 22 percent in the
more climatically favoured zones I and II.
                                                          
2. These data were collected under the supervision of our colleague, Dr. Bill Kinsey (Free University,
Amsterdam and University of Zimbabwe).  This work has been supported in Harare by the British Development
Division in Central Africa, UNICEF and the former Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. 
Additional support was provided by grants in the United Kingdom from the Nuffield Foundation, the Overseas
Development Institute, and the Department for International Development (formerly ODA).  Assistance has also
been received from the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Centre for the Study of African
Economies at the University of Oxford, the Free University, Amsterdam, and the Research Board of the
University of Zimbabwe.6
Our data are drawn from a random sample of 370 such households located in three
different resettlement schemes.  These schemes were chosen so as to ensure representation in
each of the major agro-ecological zones in Zimbabwe suited to cropping:  Mupfurudzi in
Mashonaland Central (which lies to the north of Harare in Zone II), Sengezi in Mashonaland
East (which lies south east of Harare in Zone III) and Mutanda in Manicaland (which lies
south east of Harare, but farther away than Sengezi and in Zone IV).
The criteria for selection into these schemes were, in descending order of priority: (i)
refugees or other persons displaced by war, including extra-territorial refugees, urban
refugees and former inhabitants of protected villages; (ii) those who were residing in
Communal areas but were landless; and (iii) those who had insufficient land to maintain
themselves and their families (Kinsey, 1982).  At the time of settlement, the household heads
were also supposed to be married or widowed, aged 25 to 50 and not in formal employment. 
Families selected for resettlement were assigned to these schemes, and the nucleated villages
within them, largely on a random basis.  Individuals from similar social, geographical and kin
backgrounds were often deliberately separated.  Generally, these criteria seem to have been
followed.  In our sample, some 90 percent of households settled in the early 1980s had been
adversely affected by the war for Independence in some form or another.  Before being
resettled, most had been peasant farmers (66 percent) with the remainder being landless
labourers on commercial farms, workers in the rural informal sector or wage earners in the
urban sector.
Individuals settled on these schemes were required to renounce any claim to land
elsewhere in Zimbabwe.  They were not given ownership of the land on which they were
settled but instead were given permits covering occupancy of homes and for cultivation.  
Each household was allocated 5 hectares of arable land for cultivation, with the remaining
area in each resettlement site being devoted to communal grazing land.  Households were also
allocated a residential plot within a planned village.  Indeed, these settlements are more akin
to the villages of south Asia than they are to the homestead pattern of settlement typical of
much of rural Zimbabwe.  In return for this allocation of land, the Zimbabwean government
expected male heads of households to be farmers.  Until 1992, male household heads were
not permitted to work on other farms, nor could they migrate to cities, leaving their wives to
work these plots.
Approximately 400 households were first interviewed over the period July-September
1983 to January- March 1984.  These households are located in 20 different villages (two
additional villages were added to the sample in 1993).  Just over half (57 percent) are found
in Mupfurudzi with 18 percent located in Mutanda and 25 percent found in Sengezi.   They
were re-interviewed in the first quarter of 1987 and annually, in February and March, from
1992 to 1998.  There is remarkably little sample attrition.  Approximately 85 percent of
households interviewed in 1983/84 are still in the sample.  There is no systematic pattern to
the few households that drop out.  Some were inadvertently dropped during the re-surveys, a
few disintegrated (such as those where all adults died) and a small number were evicted by
government officials responsible for overseeing these schemes.
These particular characteristics of the sample provide it with properties that are
desirable from the point of view of evaluating trade-offs between emergency and
development relief.  First, there is no requirement to address biases brought about by sample
attrition.  Second, as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988) have argued, examination of the impact
of any public intervention is hampered by considerations of selective migration and
endogenous program placement.  There are strong a priori grounds for believing that neither7
of these will affect our results.  Relocation of these households preceded, by a significant
period of time, the drought relief that was provided in the 1990s and which, as discussed
below, is the principal focus of the study.  The availability of repeated observations makes it
possible to control for any correlation between program placement and fixed, unobserved
characteristics.
In this paper, we use the 1994 to 1997 rounds, giving us a four year continuous panel.
The data were collected at the height of the hungry season and use a 12 month recall period. 
Our respondents organise their activities around the agricultural cycle.  Planting occurs in
October, with harvests occurring in May and June and so the work reported below is based on
the following cropping (October-September) years: 1992/93; 1993/94; 1994/95; and 1995/96.
 Data were collected on a variety of variables including: household demographics and
changes in composition; asset levels, sales and acquisition; inputs into agricultural
production; crop output and sales; livestock; sources and levels of non-agricultural income;
child and adult anthropometry and; morbidity.  A limited amount of expenditure data is
available from 1993/94 onwards.  Importantly, the data set includes detailed, long-term
information on households' access to various forms of drought relief, including direct food
aid, supplementary feeding of children, food for work and in 1994/95, the grain loans scheme.
(ii) Rainfall and incomes: 1992/93 - 1995/96
Figure 2 outlines levels of rainfall by agricultural year and settlement scheme from 1980/81 to
1995/96.
3  The dominant feature of this period has been two droughts.  The first, in 1991/92 ,
is commonly regarded as the worst experienced this century.  Although it was followed by
two years  of better rainfall, both 1992/93 and 1993/94 had below long-run average
precipitation.  A further drought occurred in 1994/95, followed by a recovery in 1995/96. 
Figure 2 also brings out the agro-climatic differences that exist across these different
resettlement areas.  Mutanda has consistently received less rainfall than either Mupfurudzi or
Sengezi.
The prohibitions on outside employment that existed right up to the beginning of our
four year panel, together with these observed patterns of rainfall, suggest that household
incomes will be dominated by agriculture and strongly affected by the weather.  Table 1
illustrates the former argument, Figures 3a and 3b the latter.
4
                                                          
3. These data were supplied by the Zimbabwe Meteorological Services and are based on monthly reports for
weather stations in closest proximity to our survey sites.  For the period 1991/92 to 1996/96, we take the average
of the fours stations closest to Mupfurudzi and the three stations nearest Mutanda and Sengezi.
4. The derivation of the figures on crop income are outlined in section 4.ii.. 8






























































































































Table 1: Sources of income by year
Source of Income 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
For poorest households
Crop production 79 72 31 70
71 66 28 63
Livestock 9 12 22 12
12 12 20 13
Off-farm work 7 10 15 12
8 12 12 15
Private transfers 0.3 2 1 3
0.4 2 1 3
Public transfers 4.7 4 31 3
8.6 6 39 6
Figure 3a shows average real per capita household income by scheme over this four
year period.  (The CPI is used as the deflator.)  As one would expect, the pattern is strongly
influenced by the rainfall patterns described above.  A second influence, depicted in figure
3b,  is the increase in average household size, from 7.2 to 8.4 persons, over this period.  This
increase is driven by the situation in Mupfurudzi where household size increased by 21
percent, compared to 11 percent in Mutanda and 3 percent in Sengezi.  The drop in income
adjusted for household size in 1994/95 is less dramatic for Mutanda, as household size
temporarily declines from 8.4 to 7.8.9



















































































  Mupfurudzi, situated in the most favourable agro-climatic zone, with the highest mean
levels of rainfall and best quality soil, has on average higher levels of income from crop
production than the other two schemes.  Conversely, Mutanda which is situated in the worst
agro-climatic region, with the lowest mean rainfall and poorer quality soils, reports
consistently the worst income from crop production.10
(iii) Poverty: 1992/93 - 1995/96
Our discussion of the levels and changes in per capita income provide some information on
these households.  However, to use this information to comment on standards of living
requires a benchmark - such as a poverty line - to which these income levels can be
compared.  The construction of such poverty lines is seldom unproblematic, requiring
estimates to be made of the cost of acquiring sufficient food to lead an active and healthy life
and those expenditures on nonfood goods necessary to attain some minimum standard of
living.  Ravallion (1992)  and Lipton and Ravallion (1995) outline these issues in more detail.
In 1990/91, Zimbabwe undertook a large, detailed, nationally representative survey of
incomes, consumption and expenditures (ICES).  These data were used to generate two
poverty lines for rural areas: a lower or food poverty line of Z$209 per person - based on the
need to meet minimum nutritional requirements and the food preferences and choices made
by the poorest 30percent (in relative terms) of sampled households -  and an upper or
consumption poverty line of Z$340 that made an allowance for expenditures on housing,
clothing, education, health and transport.  Making an allowance for inflation, this poverty line
rises to Z$596 in 1993 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1994, World Bank, 1995).  A second
poverty line has been constructed from data collected as part of the Poverty Assessment Study
Survey (PASS) conducted in 1995.  This also produced a food poverty and consumption
poverty lines for rural areas of Z$1180 and Z$1924 respectively (Government of Zimbabwe,
1996).  Deflating these to 1993 levels yields a food poverty line of Z$574 and a consumption
poverty line of Z$939, levels roughly 40 per cent higher than those generated by the ICES.
Accordingly, the first issue to face is whether to use the ICES poverty lines, the PASS
poverty lines or some combination of the two.  Both surveys had shortcomings.  Although the
ICES collected very detailed information on incomes and consumption, it collected no price
data and used one month recall periods which thus overlook seasonality considerations
(Jenkins and Prinsloo, 1995).  The PASS survey was conducted much more quickly -
typically taking less than an hour to complete- covered a much more ambitious range of
topics and thus obtained far less detailed information on income or expenditures.  As noted in
the PASS preliminary report, "the nature of the study itself being a poverty study, there is a
general tendency to under-report incomes and to exaggerate poverty in anticipation of
expected assistance"  (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996, p. 85).   In our view, and one echoed
in other recent studies of poverty in rural Zimbabwe such as Cavendish (1998), the PASS
poverty lines are implausibly high.  For example, applying the PASS food poverty line to the
1992/93 income data yields an incidence of  food poverty of around 35 per cent.  This occurs
in a year of good rainfall and where the vast majority of households report that they were self-
provisioning in terms of food (Kinsey, Burger and Gunning, 1998).  By contrast, the ICES
food poverty line yields a food poverty incidence of  only 15 per cent.  Consequently, we use
the ICES poverty lines as the basis for our poverty estimates and counterfactuals.
Three additional issues must also be addressed.  First, we need to take account of
regional differences in prices.  Both the ICES and PASS provide this information by
province.  Normalising prices in all rural areas to unity, the ICES gives prices for our
resettlement schemes of 0.94 in Mupfurudzi (Mashonaland Central), 0.86 in Mutanda
(Manicaland) and 1.00 in Sengezi (Mashonaland East).  The PASS gives 0.93 for
Mupfurudzi, 1.02 for Mutanda and 1.04 for Sengezi.  Clearly, using either the ICES or PASS
deflators will make little difference in the case of Mupfurudzi or Sengezi, but a substantial
difference for Mutanda.  Although we have argued that the ICES was the superior survey, we
have also noted that it did not collect price data.  Further our own observations of prices of11
retail goods in shops in all three schemes for items such as cooking oil and salt suggest that in
general prices are slightly higher in Mutanda than in the other two schemes.  Consequently,
we take the average of weights provided by these two surveys as our price deflator weights.
Second, Zimbabwe has experienced very substantial inflation during this period.  Our
poverty lines are, therefore, updated yearly using the rural CPI.  Note that we are assuming
that increases in prices over time do not differ across our three survey sites.
Finally, note that the ICES reports that the value of imputed rents in resettlement areas
is about 12 per cent of total household income or about 10 per cent of total household
consumption (expenditures plus imputed values of consumption in kind).  In areas such as
resettlement schemes where  a rental market does not exist, this is calculated by taking "the
value of construction  multiplied by a normal interest rate on savings plus depreciation"
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1994, p. 52).   Further, housing costs are a component of the
consumption poverty line, though its exact contribution is not specified.  Virtually all our
survey respondents live in dwellings that were built for them as part of the resettlement
program.  Although households were supposed to repay the costs of construction, in practice
this did not occur.  Further, our households do not own the land on which their houses sit. 
These considerations, together with the difficulty of obtaining sensible estimates of 'normal
interest rates' and 'dwelling depreciation' make it impossible to estimate the imputed values of
rents for our surveyed households.  Consequently, a direct comparison of our income figures
with the ICES consumption poverty line will overstate poverty.  Our solution, therefore, is to
modestly reduce (by 10 per cent) the non-food component when calculating the consumption
poverty line.
We use standard Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measures of poverty.
5  Let y be per
capita income with density function f(y) and a cumulative distribution function
F y f x dx
y ( ) ( ) . = ￿ 0   For a given poverty line denoted as z, poverty is given by p(y, z).  The
value of aggregate poverty - the total amount of poverty within the population is
P z p y z f y dy
y ( ) ( , ) ( ) . = ￿ 0   Define p(y, z) as  [( ) / ] z y y -
a where a ‡ 0.  The a  is a measure
of how sensitive the index is to transfers between poor units.  Note that setting a = 0- the P0
poverty measure - is equivalent to setting p(y,z) =1 so P0 is the headcount measure.  Now
suppose that a = 1, a P1 measure.  This captures the depth of poverty in that it is affected by
both poor households' distance from the poverty line as well as the number of poor
households.  The P1 poverty measure captures both the incidence and severity of poverty. 
However, under certain circumstances, it may not adequately capture differences in the
severity of poverty.  This can be resolved by setting a  equal to some value greater than 1. 
Doing so puts greater weight on the severity of poverty amongst the poor.  Table 2 reports the
incidence and severity of poverty by year and scheme using both the consumption and food
poverty lines.
                                                          
5. This paragraph draws heavily on Kakwani (1993), Kanbur (1987) and Ravallion (1993).12
Table 2. The incidence and severity of poverty by scheme and year







































































These data are consistent with the data reported for household per capita incomes. 
Mutanda, with poor soil quality, difficult climate conditions and a disparate population, has
consistently high levels of poverty compared to Mupfuruzdi and Sengezi.  However,
Mupfurudzi,  the scheme most dependent on crop production for income, experiences
significant increases in poverty in drought years.  Sengezi is slightly buffered from the
1994/95 drought by its income from non-agricultural activities.  After the 1991/92 drought
Sengezi has had consistently higher levels of income from non-agricultural activities than the
other two schemes - 11 percent in 1992/93, 17 percent in 1994/95, 20 percent in 1995/96, and
22 percent in 1995/96.  Although both Mutanda and Mupfurudzi had similarly high levels in
1995/96 in other years they earned very little of their income from these sources.
(iv) Participatory rural appraisal: Poverty and wealth ranking
There is increasing concern amongst development practitioners that formal household
questionnaires may not converge with villagers’ perceptions of poverty.  Many  argue,
(Mukherjee, 1992, Adams et al. 1997) that in order to improve the selection of beneficiaries
for poverty alleviation programmes, and hence the success of such programmes, the gap
between  standardised household interviews and villagers’ perceptions must be bridged. 
Participatory rural appraisal and related approaches have been developed to provide
alternative qualitative measures of socio-economic welfare.  Within these approaches wealth
ranking, which involves individuals or groups in a village categorising households into13
wealth piles according to their own selection criteria, has become one of the most widely used
techniques.
Before carrying out detailed quantitative analysis, therefore, we test whether our
survey data is a valid measure of economic welfare in comparison with villagers’ own
perceptions.  To triangulate the relationship we conducted a broad participatory rural
appraisal with wealth ranking as a key component in June 1997.  Drawing on the PRA
literature we followed the standard technique described in PRA Notes (1992) and Bevan
(1997).  In May 1992 IIED published a paper on ‘Special Issues on Applications of Wealth
Ranking’ which was the outcome of a series of seminars at IDS, Sussex.  Participants
exchanged experiences with wealth ranking which were then documented in the PRA Notes. 
Subsequently, Bevan (1997) conducted a more recent and practical implementation of the
guidelines.
We decided to select a random sample of 17 of the 22 villages surveyed each year
6. 
The idea was that those villages not selected could act as controls for future surveys.  The
1997 questionnaire had included some pilot qualitative questions.  If we were to build on this
in future it would be interesting to note whether the answers of villagers who had gone
through the group discussions of the PRA exercise were different from those that had not. 
In accordance with standard practice we chose three groups of informants to carry out
the exercise.  We conducted separate rankings by groups of men and women, and where
available, the agricultural extension worker.  The extension worker was a natural choice
given, first the importance of crop income for the households, second, the importance of
extension advice in determining crop income, and finally because the extension worker
knows the farmers well.  In Mutanda, however, the extension worker we had previously been
dealing with had left.  His replacement had only just been appointed, and did not feel he knew
the villagers well enough to carry out a ranking.  The chairman of the village, who had been
elected by the villagers, was chosen as a suitable replacement.  In Sengezi, we have rankings
by both extension worker and chairman, because the extension worker was absent for most of
the period of the appraisal.  On his return we used the extension worker to carry out a second
set of rankings.  Both rankings are shown in tables 3 and 4.
The process of wealth ranking started by asking villagers how they defined wealth and
poverty.  Having already prepared a card for each household, villagers were asked to sort the
cards into as many piles as they liked indicating the different wealth groups.  Once the cards
were sorted into wealth piles villagers were  asked to review the piles and make any changes
they felt necessary.  Villagers were then asked to describe the key characteristics of each
household and explain why it had been placed in its particular pile.  This lead to a general
discussion describing the key features of each pile.
In Mupfurudzi we selected 6 of the 9 villages surveyed each year.  We later added a
seventh village, Tongogara, which the other villagers continually referred to as the wealthiest
in the scheme.  We thought a ranking in this village would be useful, but on visiting found
that most people were busy working in their fields.  Instead of group rankings we conducted
an individual ranking with the head of one of the wealthier households which we could
compare with the extension worker and our income variable.
The number of households in each of the villages in this scheme ranged from 13 to 43.
 In most cases all households were surveyed and ranked.  As mentioned this resettlement
scheme is the wealthiest of the three surveyed and responded best to the wealth ranking
                                                          
6 The random sample was chosen by drawing cards out of a hat.14
exercise.  Generally, the meetings were well attended and generated lively discussion.  A
notable exception was the women’s ranking in Mudzinge, a village of apostolics characterised
by polygamous marriages.  There was a strong feeling of disunity between the women and a
distinct distrust of outsiders.  One house had the slogan ‘come as a visitor, not as a spy’
painted on the wall.
In Mutanda we selected 5 of the 7 villages.  The average number of households in
these villages was 30, but due to the set up of the survey only 10 households had been
regularly interviewed.  We limited the ranking to these 10 households, although allowed other
households to be ranked if they wished.  This proved to be the most difficult scheme. 
Attendance was low, people seemed very suspicious, and responses to the exercise were
hesitant.  There was a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and disunity amongst the participants.
An example of this lack of unity showed itself in the naming of villages.  Whereas villagers in
other schemes gave their villages names, those in Mutanda were unable to agree and
continued to refer to their village by the government assigned numbers.  The reason for the
disharmony seemed to lie in a pattern of resettlement which was noticeably different from
that in the other schemes.  The settlers in Mupfurudzi and Sengezi had strong political
awareness having been moved as part of a planned Government strategy of resettlement.  In
Mutanda, by contrast, the settlers were squatters, with very little political solidarity, who were
simply allocated the land they were squatting on by the Government. 
A ranking that did go well, however, was the men’s group in Village 24, although it
did transpire that they had a clear objective in mind.  We were later informed that they had
had a meeting before our arrival where it had decided they would ask us for a dam and
fencing.  All discussion came back to the need for these items.
In Sengezi we selected 4 of the 6 villages. The number of households in these villages
ranged from 35-55 stands, with on average half the village being surveyed each year.
One method of wealth ranking is to identify individuals from different wealth groups
and do individual rankings.  In Goto we asked the chairman to rank households in the village.
 Then using his identification we did individual rankings with the wealthiest and poorest
households.
In general the meetings in Sengezi started slowly, although attendance increased to
quite large numbers throughout the  meeting.  Rankings tended to centre around the general
rather than specific case, perhaps due to the large number of villagers who attended the
meetings.  The men’s rankings were quite lively, while the women’s were mixed.  In Mongo
the women seemed bored and unresponsive, whereas in Mawiri West they were very
‘upfront’. 
In line with other papers that have compared the technique of wealth ranking and
household surveys (Scoones, 1988 and Adams et al. 1997), this paper finds that there is
remarkable correlation between the results of these two methods. 
At the group level villagers identified poor households on a number of criteria, most
of which were visible characteristics.  Ownership of cattle, farming equipment, quality of
housing and health/education of children were noted in almost every village.  When prompted
for individual household characteristics villagers listed attributes such as the skill of the
farmer, whether the household had a bank account, and the variety of food eaten within the
household.  While men tended to focus on farming assets and quality of farming, women
often included ownership of household items, condition of clothing, and co-operation within
a household as key factors determining a households ranking.  The agricultural extension
workers focused on farming skills, in particular whether the head had a farming certificate or15
attended extension meetings.  The extension workers also tended to rank households engaged
in off-farm activities as poor, irrespective of their income from other activities.
To compare villagers’ wealth rankings with the survey data we first, compared the
men, women, and extension worker rankings with each other, and then calculated an average
of the three rankings.  These groups and group average rankings were then compared with a
number of income and capital variables.  Table 3 reports the results of rank correlations
between average household income over the period 1992/93 to 1995/96 with the villagers’
own wealth rankings
7.  Table 4 similarly compares capital ownership over the same period
with villagers’ rankings
8.
Before commenting on the tables it is worth noting that we ran rank correlations on a
number of quantitative variables, including: current income, current capital ownership, total
crop income and current crop income.  Broadly the total average income and capital
ownership variables correlated best.  They are also the variables used in the quantitative
analysis, and therefore are the results we present and discuss.
Table 3.  Rank correlation between villagers perceptions and total average household
income over the period 1992/93 -1995/96







11 Chitepo 0.738*** 0.755*** 0.723*** 0.828*** 22
12 Mudzinge 0.758*** 0.446 0.774*** 0.793*** 19
13 Muringamombe 0.396 0.464 0.522* 0.580** 25
14 Mutoramhepo 0.482 0.651 0.257 0.707* 13
15 Pedzanhamo 0.693 0.693 0.326 0.715 11
17 Tongogara 0.463** 0.547*** 0.561*** 37
19 Zvomanyanga 0.596** 0.767*** 0.497 0.669*** 23
Mutanda
21 Mt Zonwe 0.802 0.791 0.257 0.795 0.784 7
23 Village 14 0.353 0.465 0.484 0.566 10
24 Village 10 0.875** 0.529 0.720 0.526 8
26 Village 8 0.650 0.625 0.698 0.503 9
27 Village 6 0.791 0.798* 0.811* 0.767 9
Sengezi
31 Mongo 0.736*** 0.456 0.618 0.644 0.438 16
32 Goto 0.486 0.540 0.398 0.519 0.406 21
33 Rundu 0.544 0.329 0.343 0.451 0.145 20
36 Mawiri East 0.645 0.696 0.644 0.737* 0.679 12
37 Mawiri West 0.754** 0.931*** 0.546 0.863*** 0.708* 12
In this and subsequent table: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels respectively;
Village 17- other refers to household 1701;  Village 21 - other refers to household 2105.  Not chairman, but ‘top
guy’ in village;  Village 23 - other refers to two latecomers, households 2308 and 2303;
Village 24, 26, 27, 31, 33, 36 and 37 - other refers to village chairman;
Village 32 - men refers to rich household, women refers to poor household, other refers to village chairman.
                                                          
7 Average household income comprises of crop income, livestock income, income from off-farm activities and
public and private transfers.
8 Capital refers to the ownership of agricultural tools, equipment and trained oxen.16
Table 4. Rank correlation between villagers perceptions and average capital ownership
over the period 1992/93 -1995/96







11 Chitepo 0.487 0.397 0.405 0.488 22
12 Mudzinge 0.512 0.654** 0.454 0.621** 19
13 Muringamombe 0.585** 0.362 0.313 0.529* 25
14 Mutoramhepo 0.174 0.234 0.411 0.422 13
15 Pedzanhamo 0.866*** 0.722 0.363 0.821** 11
17 Tongogara 0.184 0.320 0.553*** 37
19 Zvomanyanga 0.723*** 0.742*** 0.397 0.648*** 23
Mutanda
21 Mt Zonwe 0.267 0.474 -0.086 0.265 0.294 7
23 Village 14 -0.082 0.140 0.076 0.174 10
24 Village 10 0.895** 0.858* 0.922*** 0.724 8
26 Village 8 0.765 0.417 0.624 0.626 9
27 Village 6 0.791 0.798* 0.811* 0.767 9
Sengezi
31 Mongo 0.883*** 0.737*** 0.576 0.790*** 0.909*** 16
32 Goto 0.739*** 0.780*** 0.570* 0.763*** 0.662*** 21
33 Rundu 0.765*** 0.750*** 0.642** 0.791*** 0.748*** 20
36 Mawiri East 0.797** 0.676 0.529 0.730* 0.582 12
37 Mawiri West 0.401 0.665 0.854*** 0.747** 0.466 12
The overall conclusion is positive.  There is generally a striking correlation between
villagers’ identification of wealth groups and levels of income and capital ownership.  It
should be noted that some of the coefficients are high but not significant, especially in
Mutanda.  This is because the samples sizes in Mutanda are so small in a statistical sense that
we lack the power to find a correlation.  In the larger samples the relationships come across
more powerfully.  The success of the correlations centre on two key features; first, how the
villagers defined poverty; and second, the unity or cohesion within the village. 
Although the general notion of poverty is the same across villages there are slight
differences in emphasis.  These differences are important in determining which quantitative
variable the wealth rankings correlate with, and are useful in explaining discrepancies.  The
agricultural extension worker ranked households according to farming ability, irrespective of
income earned from non-farm activities.  Given the importance of agriculture as a source of
income, this meant that in many cases the rankings of the extension worker were correlated
with the income variable.  Where off-farm income was important, however, there could be
discrepancies. In Mutoramhepo the extension worker ranked a household with the third
highest level of total income as the poorest.  His reasoning was that ‘Madawu tries his level
best, but has problems with management which results in poor yields.  He does engage in
other projects like poultry which he is good at’.  In Sengezi where households earn a greater
proportion of their income from off-farm activities the extension workers’ rankings were less
significant.  More specifically, in Mawiri West the extension worker identified those
households where members worked on commercial farms as poor because they did not use
their own land properly.  Although not presented we also ran correlations with crop income. 
In this village the rankings of the extension worker were highly correlated with the crop
income figure.17
Similarly, the women tended to define wealth in terms of ownership of assets,
including agricultural tools and household items, clothing and other visual characteristics. 
This was reflected in the high correlation of their rankings with the capital variables.  They
also tended to rank households higher than the men and extension workers, a finding also
found in the study by Scoones (1988).  An interesting example is Mudzinge where the
rankings of the women were not correlated with those of the men, extension worker or the
income variable.  However, they were correlated with the ownership of capital.  This suggests
that their rankings were based on visual success rather than well-being.  If there was as much
distrust amongst the women that was portrayed during the meeting, then this result is not
surprising.  If there is limited information sharing then the only way that they could rank each
other would be on the basis of visual assets.  This criteria for ranking seems to identify
wealthy households accurately, but is less useful for ranking the middle and lower income
households.  Consequently there was correlation between the women’s rankings of the
wealthier households and those of the men, extension worker and income variable.  Rankings
of the other households, however, was very poor.
The men tended to define wealth in terms of income from farming and assets owned
for farming, but acknowledged the importance of off-farm income for some households. 
Their rankings were highly correlated with both total income earned over the period and
capital ownership.  In Pedzanhamo the men specifically said they ranked according to
ownership of cattle and implements used for farming which explains the high correlation with
the capital variable. 
Another feature to note was the importance of harmony within a village in
determining the correlation with the quantitative variables.  Where a village was united and
worked well together there appeared to be a high correlation with the total income variable. 
Where there was less cohesion in the village the rankings tended to correlate more with the
visual variables, such as capital ownership or current income.  There was a tendency for the
small villages to be more united and have a feeling of greater solidarity, which resulted in
their rankings being more in line with the quantitative variables.
Finally the ease with which the villagers responded to the ranking exercise was
important.  Where there was reluctance, the rankings were poorly correlated.  In village 23 in
Mutanda there was negative correlation with the capital variable.  This was one of the most
remote villages we visited with no bus route or local shops.  The women were particularly
uninterested in the exercise, while the men were hesitant about ranking the poorest
households.  While there was correlation between those ranked as the wealthiest, the ranking
of the middle and poorer income households was more disparate.  In contrast, where there
was lively discussion there appeared to be high correlation, for example, Zvomanyanga where
participants turned up over 15 minutes early for the meeting.
There were drawbacks in the wealth ranking method.  It was apparent that where
villagers wanted to they were capable of accurately differentiating between wealth groups. 
However, this differentiation was done on a broad base of criteria of which it was never clear
which feature dominated, or if some unspecified criteria was implicitly considered.  Nor did
the exercise allow for quantifying the levels of wealth which made it impossible to compare
across villages.  In some villages there was a deep reluctance to participate which affected the
results.  A concern, found also by Adams (1997), is that the wealth ranking technique seems
to be sensitive to a number of factors such as, the gender of the group doing the exercise, the
number of households being ranked, the number of attendees at the meeting, and even the
attributes of the facilitators.  Nevertheless, it was useful to have discover information on18
conflict and harmony within villages that otherwise would not have been available.
The general conclusion is that, in line with similar studies, we found that the
correlations between economic indicators measured by the standard household survey and
those defined through a wealth ranking exercise, to be positive and significant.  The broad
consistency of these results therefore supports the results of the survey data.
4. Parameterising the relationships
The next step involves combining the conceptual framework outlined in section 2 with the
data described in section 3.  In doing so, it is necessary to recognise that we do not have data
available to parameterise all the relationships described in Figure 1.  It should also be noted
that our description of the sample indicates that certain causal relations are more important
than others.  Specifically:
1.  crop income is the single most important source of household income, accounting (in non-
drought years) for 75 percent or more of total household income and 70 percent of income
for households defined as poor.  Accordingly, understanding the determinants of crop
income should be an important component of our analysis;
2.  the literature on the extent to which public transfers and other sources of household
income can reduce, or crowd out, private transfers suggests, in some cases, that  crowding
out can be on the order of close to 100 percent (Cox and Jimenez, 1995).  For this reason,
this relationship should also be estimated;
3.  non-agricultural income sources, such as wage labouring, the production and sale of
handicrafts and beer, are of relatively little importance outside of drought years.  In
drought years, revenues from such sources are likely to be constrained by insufficient
demand rather than labour-leisure choices.  Consequently, these are assumed to be
exogenous;
4.  failing to account for potential second round effects risks missing the cumulative effects of
a given intervention.  Thus, we consider the relationship between increased incomes and
the accumulation of capital stock;
5.  we do not have data on expenditures for the full time span of the panel.  Consequently, we
evaluate the effect of changing relief and development interventions in terms of their
impact on poverty relative to income.
Thus, our next step is to parameterise three relations: between crop incomes, and factors of
production; private transfers, public transfers and other sources of household income; and the
determinants of investment in capital stock.  We begin by providing a brief description of our
approach to estimating these relationships and then turn to the specific results for each.
(i)  Estimation issues
In cross-section regression analysis there is always concern about correlation between
regressors and unobservable characteristics giving rise to a problem of omitted variable bias. 
If, however, it is assumed that these unobservables are constant over time for a given cross-
sectional unit or are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given time, or a combination of
both, they can be absorbed into the intercept term of a regression model as a means to
explicitly allow for the individual and/or time heterogeneity contained in the temporal cross-
sectional data.  This requires repeated observations on the same unit of observation, panel
data.19
For example, consider the impact of agricultural extension services on crop
production.   Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder (1991) argue that the observed difference in
crop yield between farmers who receive a visit by an extension worker, and those that do not,
is largely a result of the extension workers visit, and the knowledge imparted.  However the
difference in output could be independent of the extension worker, and instead correlated
with some other factor, say the quality of the farmers’ land.  A correlation between
unobserved land quality and agricultural extension advice generates the misleading result that
extension increases farm output.  Assuming that land quality is fixed, it is possible with panel
data to distinguish between the two hypotheses by studying changes in yield over time of a
farmer who once received extension advice and then did not, or vice versa.  If it is accepted
that extension services do not increase output, then the farmers yield should not be affected
when he stops receiving the advice, independent of the quality of the land.  On the other hand,
if it is accepted that extension services do increase output, it would be expected that the
farmers yield would decrease if he stopped receiving extension advice, again independent of
the quality of the land.  By following individual farmers over time as they change status, it is
possible to construct a proper recursive structure to study the before and after effect.
Following Deaton (1997), in econometric terms consider this relationship between
crop income received by the household (y), extension advice (x) and other relevant variables
such as land quality which are fixed and unobservable (q ).  Denoting the subscripts i and t as
referring to household i at time t, write:
y x u it it i t it = + + + b q m
'
The error term is decomposed into two components: mt  is a time effect that applies to all
individuals in the sample at time t, and uit  is a white noise disturbance term.  Note that if
there is correlation between mt  and x,  ordinary least squares estimation will yield biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates.
With panel data we have more than one observation on each of the sample points
which allows us to remove the fixed effects  by taking differences, or where we have more
than 2 observations by subtracting the individual means.  When T is greater than 2 we can
write:
y y x x u u it i t i i it i - = - + - + -
- - - -
( ) ( )
' m m b 2
Because the individual fixed effects q  have been removed the regression is free of any
correlation between the explanatory variables (in our example, extension advice) and the
unobserved fixed effects (land quality), and so the parameters can be estimated consistently.
However, eliminating the fixed effects is not costless.  The number of observations falls
(with T periods one is sacrificed to control for the fixed effects) which could lead to an
imprecise or inefficient estimate.  This may be worse than a biased estimate.  As Deaton
argues (1997) the tradeoff between bias and efficiency has to be made on a case-by-case
basis.  For this reason we include the results of the OLS regressions, the pooled OLS
regression, and the fixed effects regression.  We also report the results on the F-test which
tests if individual household effects have no impact on the dependent variable, (in this
example, income), and the Hausman specification test which tests whether the errors are
uncorrelated with the variables.  If the set of coefficients that are estimated by the fixed
effects estimator and the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are not
significantly different then we can accept that the errors are uncorrelated with the variables. 20
(ii) Crop Income Function
In this sub-section, we explain how we model the determinants of crop income.  We begin
with a brief theoretical description before moving on to describe the data we use to estimate
this relationship and to present the econometric results based on the estimation methodology
described above.
Define profits from producing crops as revenues minus costs.  If the household
produces n crop outputs (y1, y2,..,yn) and uses m inputs (x1, x2,…,xm), and prices of the output
goods are (p1, p2,…,pn) and of the inputs (w1, w2,…,wm), the profits the households receive,
p , can be expressed as
p = ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ p y w x i i i i (4.ii.1)
Note that yi is a function of the application of the inputs (x1, x2,…,xm) so we can re-
write this as:
p = ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ p f x x x w x i i m i i ( , ,..., ) 1 2 (4.ii.2)
Assuming that households are profit maximisers they will combine their factors of
production in a way so as to maximise their profit.  By partially differentiating 4.ii.2 with
respect to various inputs we can obtain the standard result that farmers will use these inputs to
the point where their marginal return equals their marginal cost.  Our interests are somewhat
different.  We would like to know how an increase in x will affect real profitsp .
To do this, we estimate the relationship between net crop income, and factors of
production in real terms.  Because we consider profits in real terms we do not have to worry
about nominal price effects.  As the construction of these variables is not entirely
unproblematic, we describe these in detail beginning with the dependent variable, net crop
income, then output prices and finally the factors of production.
As discussed in section 4.ii the dependent variable, net crop income, is the most
important source of income for households in this sample.  Households planted, on average, 2
out of 3 of the following crops: maize, cotton, tobacco, sunflowers, groundnuts, nyimo,
rapoko, mhunga, (types of grain) and sorghum.  Of these maize is the most important source
of cash income for the majority of households.  Over the period of the sample 99 percent of
farmers grew maize.  For households in Mupfurudzi cotton is also an important source of
cash income. 
During each interview, households were asked to report yield, sales and retention, for
each crop, for the previous harvest.  Gross income from crop production was calculated as
total yield (sales plus retention) multiplied by the price.  Price was calculated for each
household by dividing total sales value by the quantity sold.  Where a household did not sell
any of the crop, its total yield was multiplied by the median price for the sample.  Net income
was calculated by subtracting the cost of fertiliser and hired labour from the gross figure
9. 
Inputs into crop production include agricultural capital stock, labour, land, fertilisers,
human capital and rainfall.  We describe the construction of each of these, beginning with a
key variable for our analysis, capital stock.
We define agricultural capital stock as consisting of those tools and equipment used in
crop production.  This includes the following:  ox-ploughs, scotch carts, cultivator/harrows,
ox-planters, water carts, cotton sprayers, wheelbarrows, tractors and tractor equipment, hoes,
axes, spades, machetes and slashers.  Information on holdings of these tools is available for
                                                          
9 Households were asked how much fertiliser and pesticide they had used, this was then converted to a monetary
value by multiplying the quantity by the prices quoted by ‘Windmill’ the main distributor of fertiliser in
Zimbabwe.  Households were also asked if they had used hired labour and how much they had paid.21
all four years considered here.  Valuation of the items, however, is slightly tricky.
As part of the surveys, households were asked about what items they owned, when
they were obtained, how much they paid for it, and how much it would cost today.  Answers
to these questions revealed two problems.  First, a number of households did not remember,
and therefore report, what they had paid for the item.  Second, the prices of virtually identical
items were highly variable between households, perhaps due to problems of recall or
differences in knowledge regarding current prices.  Rather than allowing the price of capital
goods to vary across households, we impose a uniform price across households.  Specifically,
the median purchase price of items both acquired and reported for the crop year 1995/96 were
used as a base.  (These are assumed to suffer fewer recall problems.)  These were then
deflated using the consumer price index to derive prices for other survey years.  As an
example, the median reported purchase price for an ox-plough in 1995/96 was Z$775.  Table
7 compares the deflated values of this figure with the median reported buying prices in
previous years.  The correspondence between these is reasonably close, although our method
appears to overstate the value of an ox-plough.
Table 7: Comparison of deflated and actual median ox-plough prices
Year 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
(a) median reported purchase price 418 500 550 775
(b) 1995/96 price deflated by CPI 436 533 653 775
(a) / (b) 0.96 0.94 0.84 1
The validity of our approach relies on assumptions regarding the deflator and the
treatment of depreciation.  Specifically, we deflate the price of agricultural capital goods
using a consumer price index.  Implicitly, we are assuming that changes in the prices of the
former broadly mimics the latter.  Assets typically decline in value as a result of wear and
tear.  Many argue, for example, Anderson (1991), that this reduction in value must be
reflected in the capital stock measure.  In other words, depreciation should be deducted from
gross investment in order to calculate the increase in capital which is relevant to explaining
increases in output.  The implication of this view is that each $1 of depreciation reduces
output by as much as each $1 of gross investment increases output.  Scott (1991), however,
argues that a machine that produces the same quantity of output ceteris paribus, year-in year-
out cannot be said to have experienced any depreciation.  He argues that capital only
depreciates when it becomes obsolete.  For this reason, he argues that capital stock should be
measured in gross terms, not net of depreciation.  This argument reflects the situation facing
households in the sample.  Due to the nature of asset ownership within the sample it would
lead to a gross underestimate of the contribution of capital to growth if conventional systems
of growth accounting were used.  Many households own and still use equipment handed
down from previous generations.   For example, in 1982/83 over 50 percent of households
owned and used an ox-plough which was over 10 years old (11 percent of households owned
an ox-plough over 30 years old).  Therefore to measure the effect of capital under these
circumstances the appropriate measure of capital stock is a gross figure, and not a net figure.
Figure 4 shows a steady increase in the ownership of capital in all three schemes. 
From an average of $2,663 per household, capital grew by 18 percent.  The change in capital
reflects the changes in income over the period.  Starting from the low level in 1992/93 it
steadily increased until the 1994/95 drought.  During this period the level remained constant,22
but increased with the better harvest the following year.








































Agricultural production is also dependent on livestock available for ploughing. 
Households were asked to report the number of trained oxen they owned and their value.  The
figures on value varied greatly therefore we decided to include the number of pairs of trained
oxen as a related capital variable.
The ideal measure of labour usage would be days worked, by person and activity. 
Unfortunately, this measure is not available for all survey years.  As a crude proxy, we take
available family labour supply - defined as the number of people in the household between
the ages of 15 and 64.
The principal chemical inputs used by the farmers include compound D as an initial
fertiliser, and ammonium nitrate as a top dressing.  In addition a number of farmers use
pesticides.  These are all measured in kilograms and added together to create the fertiliser
variable.
Recent research has emphasised the importance of human capital as an input into
agricultural production.  This includes formal schooling, the acquisition of farming
experience and access to agricultural extension.  Since formal schooling is a fixed
characteristic for adults in the household, it drops out when we first difference our variables. 
Acquisition of farming experience will be highly collinear with other variables that trend
upwards and hence was excluded.  However, access to extension advice provided by the
Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGITEX)  - on land
preparation, the timeliness of operations, crop spacing, plant population sizes, the use of
better seeds and varieties, fertiliser use and pest control -  varies significantly from farmer to
farmer and from year to year.  In particular, funding cut-backs are largely responsible for a
drop in the percentage of households receiving at least one visit from an AGITEX officer
from 76 percent in 1991/92 to 62 percent in 1995/96.  In the results reported below, access to
extension is measured as a dummy variable equalling one if the household received at least
one visit that year and zero otherwise, extension 2  is one if the household had one or two23
visits, extension 3 is one if the household had one to five visits, extension 4  is one if the
household had one to ten visits, and extension 5 is one if the household had one to some
indefinite number of visits.  Hence beyond one visit the variables will be picking up the
incremental effect of additional visits.
The final independent variable included is annual rainfall by scheme which has been
described in section three.
Mean values in 1992 Z$, averaged over the four year panel, for these variables are:




net crop income $4,285 5076
Independent variables
capital tools $2,900 1865
labour 4.97 2.69
land cultivated 3.50 hectares 1.37
fertiliser 744 kilograms 735
Using the estimation method described in section 4.ii, we estimate the following
model in ordinary least squares and first differences.  We present first, the OLS results for
individual years, second, the results from the pooled sample, and third, the fixed effects
estimates.
log log log log log Y K O L A F
X X X X X R
it it it it it = + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿
+ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿
a b b b b b
b b b b b b
1 2 3 4 5
6 1 7 2 8 3 9 4 10 5 11
(4.ii.3)
where:   Y  is net crop income;     K  is capital;    
O  is pair of trained oxen; L  is labour; 
A  is land;   F  is fertiliser; 
X1  is at least 1 extension visit;  X 2  is at least 2 extension visits; 
X 3  is at least 3 extension visits; X 4  is at least 4 extension visits; 
X5is at least 5 extension visits;   R  is rainfall;
a b , are parameters to be estimated;
and i denote households and t time.24









Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff t-stat. Coeff t-stat.
log of capital 0.310  2.948*** 0.352  4.327*** 0.137  0.930 0.203  2.394**
trained oxen 0.130  2.204** 0.181  2.773*** 0.243  2.466** 0.107  2.506**
log of labour 0.168  1.843* -0.089 -1.060 0.336  1.699* -0.136 -1.656*
log of land 1.073  9.459*** 1.144  9.366*** 0.852  3.204*** 1.200 10.215***
log of fertiliser -0.02 -0.710 0.111  3.246*** 0.023  0.366 0.054  2.370**
extension 1 0.312 2.144** -0.062 -0.425 -0.102 -0.339 0.207  1.762*
extension 2 -0.015 -0.115 0.219  1.397 0.174  0.502 -0.023 -0.167
extension 3 0.007  0.060 0.050  0.289 0.082  0.285 -0.034 -0.255
extension 4 -0.040 -0.259 -0.167 -0.709 -0.248 -0.661 0.085  0.157
extension 5 -0.003 -0.021 0.030  0.134 0.706  1.591
rain 0.006  5.782*** 0.004  5.662*** 0.004  2.325** -0.004 -7.035***
constant -0.827 -0.642 -0.653 -0.654 2.822  1.283 7.248  6.570***
R-squared 0.50 0.53 0.21 0.52
F-test 32.11*** 39.80*** 6.04*** 31.98***
In this and subsequent tables: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels respectively;
T-statistic calculated using White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
Table 10: Pooled and fixed effects estimates of the determinants of net crop income
Pooled n = 1381 Fixed Effects n = 1381
Coeff. t statistic Coeff. t statistic
log capital tools 0.285  5.649*** 0.324  3.093***
trained oxen 0.117  3.544*** 0.010  0.203
log of labour 0.168  2.846*** 0.168  1.576
log of land 1.091 14.430*** 0.662  6.505***
log of fertiliser 0.119  6.756*** 0.027  0.930
extension 1 0.381  4.410*** 0.253  2.565***
extension 2 -0.104 -1.158 -0.007 -0.066
extension 3 -0.019 -0.215 -0.055 -0.563
extension 4 -0.085 -0.640 0.033  0.207
extension 5 0.042  0.297 0.009  0.048
rain 0.015  4.679*** 0.022  8.603***
rain squared -9.9e-6 -3.825*** -1.6e-5 -7.488***
constant -2.828 -2.382** -2.648  0.059
R-squared 0.42 0.55
F-test F(12,1368) 74.59*** F(398,970)  1.499***
Including year dummies did not significantly alter the coefficients or their standard errors.
The crop income function was also estimated by quantile regression which takes the median of the distribution
rather than the mean.  Under this method the coefficients and their standard errors did not significantly change.
The F statistic tests the hypothesis that all coefficients excluding the constant are zero.  In all cases we can reject
the null hypothesis.
The Hausman specification test tests whether the errors are uncorrelated with the variables. In this case we reject
the null hypothesis that the differences in the coefficients are not systematic.  That is, we accept that there are
unobservable differences across households which are not random.  Chi-squared (12) = 92.01***.25
There are a number of interesting features to note.  The coefficient on agricultural
capital variable is well measured.  Its magnitude is robust across alternative estimation
procedures.   Standard OLS estimations for each year, and estimations pooling all years,
consistently yield coefficients close to 0.3 (although those in drought and flood years tend to
be lower).  The contribution of trained oxen to net income appears to be correlated with the
farmer.  When unobserved characteristics are controlled for, as in the fixed effects model, the
coefficient on trained oxen falls and is no longer significant.  In contrast the coefficient on
tools increases and remains significant.  Second,  the coefficients on the extension variables
show that while one extension visit significantly boosts income, additional visits have no
impact.  This has implications for policy which we will pursue later.  Further, if we compare
the pooled and fixed effects coefficients we see that when unobserved characteristics are
controlled for the coefficient falls from 0.38 to 0.25.  This suggests that one-third of the effect
of extension on income is correlated with the farmer, but that most of the effect is
independent of the farmer.
The coefficients on rainfall are, as expected, positive and significant, in non-drought
years, and negative and significant in the flood year.  The inclusion of the squared rain
variable in the pooled regressions is to pick up this effect.  Not surprisingly, up to a certain
level of rainfall income will increase, beyond that level the effect on income will be negative.
(iii)  The relationship between private transfers, public transfers and other sources of
household income
We now turn to a consideration of a potentially important second round effect, namely the
potential for public transfers or other sources of household income to induce reductions in the
receipt of private transfers, a phenomenon also known as 'crowding out'.  As in our discussion
of the determinants of crop income, we begin with an explanation of how we justify the
inclusion of the variables that appear in our regression results.  We describe how these are
constructed using our data set before moving onto a summary of our results.
Consider two households, i, where i = d, r.
10  Denote their income as Yi.  Household d
transfers money, PT, to household r.  In addition, governments provide public transfers to
these households Ji.
The relationship between private transfers and public transfers can be written as:
PT = pt(yd, (yr + J)) (4.iii.4)
The important parameter in an estimated version of (4.iii.4) is on (yr + J).  Note that
we have the following possible cases.  If the parameter on (yr + J) = -1 the donor's motive is
altruism and we have complete crowding out.  If the parameter is 0 we have an exchange
motive.  Public transfers either have no effect on public transfers or they crowd-in private
transfers.  A parameter lying between 0 and -1 could be generated by either altruism, as in the
case where public transfers are externally funded, or exchange.  However, by imposing a little
further structure, it is possible to separate these out.  Under exchange, the implicit price of
services is a function of the recipients income.  There is no plausible reason why the
composition of the recipients income would affect this relationship.  This may not hold true if
altruism is the motivation.  Under altruism, the donor might treat income received as public
transfers differently from that received as earned income.  They could regard the latter as
                                                          
10.The theory underlying the response of private transfers to the provision of public transfers is based on work
originally undertaken by Becker (1974) and extended by Cox (1987), Cox and Jimenez (1992) and Cox and
Jakubson (1995).26
being a more virtuous form of income. 
The next step is to set out a form of (4.iii.4) that can be estimated with the data
available here.  The dependent variable is net private transfers received by the household. 
This is the difference between remittances received from relatives, neighbours and friends
living outside of the household less transfers made by the household to these individuals. 
Where items were received or given in-kind, physical quantities are converted into monetary
values using median prices calculated for similar goods.  Average, net private transfers were
Z$87 per household per annum (standard deviation: 485).  Public transfers are a measure of
the value of all types of assistance given to households by the state.  It includes the monetary
value of food aid, supplementary feeding, food-for-work, and in-kind transfers of fertiliser
and seeds.  In non-drought years, these tend to account for only a small fraction of household
income, around 4 per cent.  They are much more important during droughts, accounting for
19 per cent in 1994/95.  In non-drought years average public transfers were Z$155 per
household per annum, including the drought year Z$362 per household per annum (standard
deviation: 606).
Our data set does not contain information on incomes of migrants and other
individuals making transfers to our respondents.  With the data available to us on out-
migration: when they left; where they live and their current occupation, we do the following. 
First, we assume that earnings increase with experience, but these vary by occupation.  That
is, we might expect that the earnings profile for a low-skill migrant - say a farm labourer -
will differ from a high-skill migrant such as a bank manager.  Second, from the point of view
of estimating the crowding out relationship, it is the total income of all migrants that is
important.  So what we include as our proxy for this is the total amount of job experience of
all migrants by occupation (low, medium and high).  Next, we create a second set of
variables, the number of migrants living in different localities: local, rural; local, urban; non-
local rural or urban; and major urban (Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and people living in
Botswana and S. Africa).  This captures the fact that within Zimbabwe wages vary spatially.
In addition to these regressors, it has been argued that altruistically motivated
migrants may send greater remittances to households containing dependants such as young
children or the elderly (Hoddinott, 1994).  To control for this, we include the number of
children (by sex), and adults (by age and sex) in our regressions.
The estimated model is that described previously:
PT yr X v it it it it i it = + + + + b t b g h 1 2 ( ) (4.iii.5)
where: PT is private transfers received by the household;
t public transfers;
yr other sources of household income;
Xit is a vector of other migrant and household characteristics (as described
above), including location, job type and years of migration of migrants and
the number of children and adults (by sex) in the recipient household; and
b b g 1 2 , and  are parameters to be estimated.
Our concern in this paper is the extent to which public transfers crowd out net private
transfers.  To save space only the results on the income  variables are reported.  Full results
are available on request.27
Table 11: Pooled and fixed effects estimates of the determinants of net private transfers
public transfers other income
Coefficient t.statistic Coefficient t.statistic
1992/93  0.005     0.477 -0.0001  -0.121
1993/94  -0.010    -0.624 0.002   0.869
1994/95  0.033    0.663 0.022   1.067
1995/96 0.0002    0.004 0.001   0.225
pooled 
without time dummies -0.006  -0.233 0.002   1.228
F-test :  2.57***
with time dummies 0.017   0.641 0.001   0.728
F-test :  3.70***
fixed effects
11
without time dummies -0.008  -0.390 -0.002  -0.544
F-test :  1.314***
with time dummies 0.041   1.490 -0.004  -1.421
F-test : 1.323***  
The striking result from these regressions is that there appears to be no crowding out
of private transfers with the provision of aid.  This is not surprising given the very small
amounts of private transfers received in comparison to public transfers.  It is therefore safe to
assume no crowding out in the simulation model to follow.
(iv) Investment
We now turn to a second potentially important feedback effect, namely the link between
increased incomes and investment.  This can either be estimated or derived from the
production function described in section 4.ii..  Due to difficulties in estimating an investment
function the second approach is adopted here
12. 
Following Branson (1979), the first step is to note that equilibrium capital stock is the
level at which the marginal revenue of an addition to this stock equals its marginal cost. 
Denote R as revenue, P as price, C as cost.  Marginal revenue is: MR / MK = M(Py)/ MK = P My /
MK.  Marginal cost is MC / MK = C and so under this equilibrium condition, C = P My / MK. 
Next, recall that in section 4.ii, that the relationship between y and K is estimated using a
Cobb-Douglas production function (equation 4.ii.3).  Partially differentiating this with respect
to K yields My / MK = " @ (y / K) where " is the coefficient on the capital stock.  Note that My /
MK appears in both the marginal cost and marginal revenue equations; a little manipulation
yields:
My / MK = " y / K = C / P (4.iv.6)
As this describes an equilibrium condition, the equilibrium capital stock can be written
as:
K
E = " @ y ( P / C) (4.iv.7)
Investment is the change in capital stock from one period to the next.  Assume that
                                                          
11 Hausman test: chi-squared (17)=39.18***.
12 To estimate an investment function we need to consider the change in income and change in capital from one
year to the next.  This immediately drops the panel element to three years.  Also those households that had zero
income during the drought year would fall out of the estimation.  Both these factors bring the sample size below
that needed to estimate efficient and unbiased parameters.28
farmers adjust from actual to equilibrium capital stock in one period (this is relaxed below). 




E = ) (" y) (P/C) (4.iv.8)
Recall that the coefficient on capital stock, " is stable over the period estimated here
and so equation (4.iv.8) is re-written as:
) K
E = " ()y) () P/ )C) (4.iv.9)
It is assumed that () P/ )C) = 1.  The Government of Zimbabwe's Producer Price
Index (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998) shows that over the period 1988- 1996, producer
prices for foodstuffs (a proxy for P) have risen at an annual rate of about 27 per cent, whereas
producer prices for metal products - the closest proxy available for agricultural capital goods,
have risen by about 24 per cent per year.  Assuming () P/ )C) = 1 is therefore, if anything, a
conservative assumption.  Accordingly, ) K
E = " ()y).  Table 10 indicates that " takes on a
value of 0.325, and so the relationship between changes in income and changes in the capital
stock is given by:
) K
E = 0.325  ()y)
Finally, note that this approach assumes that there are no adjustment lags in moving
from current to equilibrium capital stock.  Although this is clearly an unrealistic assumption,
it can be easily relaxed by assuming an adjustment process (for example, assuming that half
the adjustment takes place in the first year etc.)  This is incorporated into the simulation
models presented in the next chapter.
 
5. Counterfactuals: Quantifying the trade-offs between relief and development
assistance
The next step is to use these estimated relationships to simulate the effects of alternative relief
and development interventions on incomes and the incidence and severity of poverty. The
purpose of the counterfactuals is to present a ‘what if’ scenario to give a sense of what the
opportunity costs are of switching from development aid to relief aid, rather than a
prescription for action at the household level.  The interventions we choose in these
counterfactuals are driven by the results found in section 4.ii on the determinants of crop
income.  We begin with a general overview of our counterfactual analysis, followed by a
description of the counterfactuals we run.  We then turn to a discussion of the results.
(i) General outline of the counterfactual
The intuition behind our counterfactuals is the following.  Recall that we observe households
over the period 1992/93 to 1995/96.  There is one drought year in 1994/95 and three non-
drought years.  It should be noted that in 1991/92, immediately prior to the period we
consider, there was the extraordinary drought of the century that gripped all of southern
Africa and for which Zimbabwe received much external assistance.  The drought in 1995/96
received less international publicity and was addressed primarily by domestic resources.   The
principal response of the Government of Zimbabwe was a targeted grain loans scheme  (there
was also a small supplementary feeding program.)  Rather than provide households with gifts
of maize, the intention was that these allocations would be in-kind loans, repayable in kind
following the next (1995/96) harvest.  In practice, however, the scheme seems to have been
largely untargeted.  In our survey areas, 87 percent of households received these loans.  The
value of grain allocated was remarkably similar across households regardless of their income29
levels.  Further, repayment of these loans has been, at best, sporadic.  Our survey data suggest
that a generous estimate would be that 25 per cent of recipients had repaid their loans in full.
Table 12: Value of per capita grain loan received by per capita income quintiles
Per capita income quintiles Value of per capita grain loan received
(standard deviation)




5 (richest) 106 (107)
In light of this evidence, we consider the grain loans scheme to have been largely an
untargeted transfer scheme.  Our counterfactual analysis is based on the following.  Suppose
that instead of waiting for the next drought to occur, either external donors or the Government
of Zimbabwe had, in addition to the drought relief supplied in 1991/92, provided some or all
of our households with additional capital stock at the beginning of the 1992/93 agricultural
season, and/or agricultural extension advice throughout the period.  The funding for this is
obtained by reallocating the resources used for the 1994/95 grain loans scheme
13.
Five features of such a counterfactual should be noted. 
First, our counterfactual analysis is not based on increasing external transfers, but
rather reallocating existing transfers across time and across households.
Second, the allocation of capital occurs at the beginning of the 1992/93 agricultural
season, after the 1991/92 drought year, and the extension advice in each year where there was
no visit.  One concern may be that households will consume rather than retain the allocation
of capital.  We know that the relief aid given in 1994/95 is consumed.  This comment is based
on data we have that indicates that despite the drought, households were dissaving in the
aftermath of the drought (Kinsey, Burger and Gunning, 1997).  The concern therefore
revolves around the notion of whether these households would consume a ‘windfall’ of
capital.  Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1989) on the coffee boom in Kenya argue that African
households generally save a large proportion of such windfalls (82 percent).  We have
evidence that when these households received such ‘windfall’ assistance in the form of free
fertiliser and seeds at the beginning of the crop year 1992/93, this was actually used for
production rather than consumed.  We therefore assume no consumption of the initial
allocation of capital stock.  Any relaxation of this assumption effectively lowers the reduction
in poverty.  Hence we acknowledge that the counterfactual estimates may reflect an upper
bound of the extent of poverty reduction. 
Third, our 'development' allocation is the provision of additional capital stock and
extension advice.  This follows from the finding, reported in section 4.ii, that capital stock
                                                          
13 In this simulation model, we transfer the funds from 1994/95 to  1992/93, without discounting.  We do so for
two reasons.  First, if we discounted using the real Zimbabwe rate of interest - for example, the rate on the 91
day Government treasury bills, or the rediscount rate less inflation - we get a slightly negative rate.  So the
discounting would yield a figure slightly higher than the value of the relief aid.  Another way round this would
be to use the long term interest rate on gilts or US treasury bonds, which historically have been about 3 percent. 
Discounting using such a figure would reduce the value of the development assistance by only a small amount
(just over 12 percent) and so it is not clear that such a discounting would have a significant impact on the results.30
and a visit by an extension worker both have a large, positive effect on increasing household
crop income.  From section 4.ii we know that the provision of one extension visit per year
dramatically increases income, but that subsequent visits have little or no impact.  We
therefore base the counterfactuals on providing one visit per year to households that had not
previously received a visit.  The number of households that did not receive a visit in: 1992/93
was 59, 144 in 1993/94; 171 in 1994/95;  and 141 in 1995/96.
Fourth, the cost of an extension visit is calculated from data supplied by the Ministry
of Agriculture in Zimbabwe.  Taking into account salary and mileage costs an estimate of $10
per visit was calculated.  To be conservative we doubled this figure
14. 
Fifth, we do not re-allocate any of the funds associated with the supplementary
feeding programs that were put in place in 1994/95.
(ii)Mechanics of the counterfactual
To fix precisely how these counterfactuals operate, recall that in section 4.ii, we estimated the
following relationship: ln(net crop income) = 0.324 * ln(capital) + 0.288 * extension1 + other
regressors.  With respect to capital, in this log-log specification, the elasticity of crop income
with respect to capital is the coefficient on log capital.  That is, 0.324 = (dy/dk) / (y/k) which
implies dy = 0.324 * (y/k) * dk.  For a given increase in capital stock, income rises by the
product of that change multiplied by the crop income-capital ratio multiplied by 0.324.  In the
semilog relationship between extension and income the interpretation is slightly different. 
Because the coefficient on the extension dummy measures the discontinuous effect on
income, the appropriate interpretation is g = exp(b6)-1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1979).  In
our case, g = exp (0.254) - 1, g = 0.289.  Based on this interpretation gaining access to
extension will increase farm income by 29 percent.  So the change in income is calculated as
dy = y * 0.29.
Next consider possible second round effects.  The first is the possibility that this
increase in private income will lead to a reduction in private transfers.  But from the results
presented in section 4.iii, we know that virtually no such crowding out will occur.  As
explained above, we assume that income from all other sources - such as wage labour,
handicrafts and beer brewing - is exogenous.  Accordingly, the remaining second round effect
to consider is the relationship between capital stock accumulation and changes in income.  As
outlined in section 4.iv, this is given by I = 0.324 * dy + other regressors.  An increase in
income of $1 will increase capital stock by $0.324.  As noted in section 4.iv., however, 
households are unlikely to immediately invest in capital in response to an increase in income.
 If we assume a lag of 0.5, this reduces the coefficient to 0.162.  To be cautious we use this
reduced coefficient in the simulations
15.
Now consider the case of the following hypothetical household.  Initial income in
1992/93 is $2000, comprising $1500 of net crop income, $100 of public transfers, $200 of
                                                          
14 The Ministry of Agriculture supplied data on extension workers salaries, mileage allowances, per diems, and
housing costs by scheme for: 1984 when the schemes were first resettled, 1992 and 1996.  From Kinsey (1982)
we have information on the number of villages and households each extension worker was responsible for
covering.  From the survey we know the number of visits the extension workers made to the households in the
sample in each year.  Assuming housing costs are fixed we calculated the salary and mileage allowance costs per
extension worker.  We then calculated the number of visits made and from this derived a per visit cost.  The cost
per visit in Mutanda and  Mupfurudzi was $10, and Sengezi $8.  To be conservative we took the highest figure
and doubled it.
15 It should be noted that running the simulations with 0.324 or 0.162 makes little or no difference to the poverty
levels.31
private transfers and  $200 from all other (exogenous) sources.  The household has an initial
capital stock of $3000.  If the household receives a capital stock transfer at the beginning of
1992/93 of $250, it will generate an additional  $40  ( = $250 * (1500/3000) * 0.324) in crop
income.  Recall that none of this additional crop income is crowded out by a reduction in
private transfers, and other income sources are exogenous.  So the increase in total household
income in 1992/93 is $40.  Next, recall the relationship between changes in income and
changes in capital stock.  Higher incomes in 1992/93 increase capital stock by $7 (= $40 *
0.162) and so the household begins the 1993/94 season with an additional $257 (the initial
allocation of $250 plus the $7 of additional investment).  Consequently, in 1993/94 crop
incomes rise as a result of both the initial transfer of capital stock and also the additional
investment made by the household.
We now carry out the same exercise for extension.  If a household receives a visit
by an extension worker at the beginning of 1992/93 this will generate additional income of
$435 (= 1500 * 0.29).  Higher income in 1992/93 will increase capital stock by $70 (= 435 *
0.162).  Consequently, in 1993/94 crop income rises as a result of both the additional income
from the extension visit and also the additional investment made by the household.
(iii)  Counterfactuals
Now we consider a number of alternative relief and development interventions and their
impact on incomes and incidence and severity of poverty.  The counterfactuals are going to
appear along two dimensions, first variations on development interventions, and second
alternative targeting strategies.  Development interventions can be divided into two cases:
where the grain loan is redistributed in the form of capital equipment, and where the loan is
used to fund extension visits and some capital equipment.
We chose to target the aid in three ways.  The first is called ‘like for like’.  In this
counterfactual each household is allocated capital stock at the beginning of 1992/93
agricultural year exactly the value of assistance received in 1994/95.  From section 5.i. we
know that the grain loan was largely untargeted so this counterfactual reflects the most likely
transfer of development aid.  This counterfactual is the least demanding in terms of
information needed.
The second targeting mechanism is geographic: it re-allocates aid given to wealthy
villages to poor villages.  This is seen as a relatively straight forward way of identifying the
poor and requires only limited information.  We  rank the twenty-two villages on the basis of
average per capita incomes over the four year period.  Drought relief given in 1994/95 to the
five best off villages over the four year period is reallocated in 1992/93 to the poorest five
villages according to this ranking.  However, those taking decisions on the allocation of aid
may not have more than a ‘snapshot’ view of which villages are poor or rich.  Using the
‘snapshot’ variant therefore, we redistribute drought relief given to the five wealthiest villages
in 1994/95 to the five poorest villages identified by their per capita income in 1992/93.
A final method of targeting is to take the grain loan allocated to the rich and give it to
the poor, hence the name ‘robin hood’.  In this case assistance is only provided to those
households whose average per capita incomes over the four year period are in the bottom
third of the distribution.  Relief that previously went to households in the top third of this
distribution is reallocated at the beginning of the 1992/93 agricultural year.  In this case the
grain loan allocated to the bottom two-thirds of the distribution is left untouched.  A variant is
again the ‘snapshot’ method whereby the poorest third in 1992/93 are given the grain loan
which had been allocated to the top third in 1994/95, both identified by their per capita32
incomes in 1992/93 and 1994/95 respectively
16.
Table 13 shows how much aid is reallocated per recipient household for each
counterfactual.  The allocation of aid for the capital counterfactuals is straight forward.  The
value of the total grain loan to be redistributed is divided amongst the intended beneficiaries. 
The average total cost for extension services over all four years is $35.   The final column
gives an average of aid received by any beneficiary household who receives either capital or
extension, or a combination of the two.
Table 13: Average allocation of aid per recipient household













Like for Like 320 $995
Geographic (1) 55 $1,870
Geographic (2) 47 $1,917
Robin Hood (1) 123 $701
Robin Hood (2) 123 $806
Extension 287 $35
Extension &  Like for Like 320 $963 287 $35 362 $851
Extension & Geographic 55 $1,683 287 $35 307 $301
Extension & Robin Hood 123 $617 287 $35 313 $243
Tables 15, 16 and 17 provide the results of running, first, the capital counterfactuals
based on the first three targeting criteria, and second, the extension advice and capital
counterfactuals based on a sub-set of the first three targeting criteria.  We begin with a
detailed discussion of the ‘like for like’ capital counterfactual and a comparative analysis of
the impact of alternative targeting strategies.  We then discuss these alternative targeting
strategies in relation to the extension and capital development interventions.
The ‘like for like’ counterfactual is the simplest of the five capital counterfactuals we
consider.  All that is done is change the timing of the intervention without changing either the
identity of the recipients or the amount they receive.  Doing so at the beginning of 1992/93
raises recipient incomes in that year by an average of 6 percent per person.  P0 consumption
poverty falls by 5 per cent from 0.41 to 0.39.  P0 food poverty falls by about 8 percent, from
0.26 to 0.24.  The percentage reductions in P2 poverty are even larger, with the severity of
consumption poverty falling by 11 per cent and food poverty by nearly 16 per cent.  Poverty
falls further in 1993/94, but appears to rise sharply in the drought year of 1994/95 as these
households no longer receive the in-kind income in the form of maize grain.  Poverty then
falls relative to actual outcomes in the post-drought year of 1995/96.
These results suggest that the direct substitution of relief with development assistance
embodies a trade-off between reducing poverty in non-drought years and increasing poverty
in drought years.  The increased poverty in 1994/95 is quite substantial.  P0 food poverty rises
by nearly 47 per cent and nearly three quarters of all households fall below the consumption
poverty line.  However, this overlooks an important fact, namely that the capital stock
available to these households is higher because they have not consumed the original aid
allocation, and because they have used some of the additional incomes generated to
                                                          
16 We experimented with different allocation rules, such as taking from the top 50 percent of the distribution and
giving to the bottom 20 percent.  The poverty levels remained basically unchanged.33
accumulate further capital.  Suppose we make the reasonable assumption that in 1994/95,
households who received assistance at the beginning of the simulation dissave this
accumulated capital to the point where their counterfactual incomes in 1994/95 equal their
actual incomes.  Under this variant of our counterfactual, there is only a 1 percent increase in
poverty in this drought year.  Further, food poverty still falls in the subsequent year because
the capital stock accumulated as a consequence of the earlier transfer of aid is still available
to the household.
Our next step is to compare our ‘like for like’ counterfactual with the results from the
other targeted counterfactuals.  In the first two years of these simulations, the ‘like for like’
counterfactual dominates the others in terms of poverty reduction.  In the third (drought) year,
1994/95, with dissaving, the ‘like for like’ simulation performs no better than the actual
outcome and all other measures register an increase in poverty.  These results emerge despite
the fact that under the targeted interventions, more capital per person is provided to recipient
households in the geographic allocation, and two-thirds of the grain loan is untouched in the
‘robin hood’ allocation.  Table 15 shows that the geographic targeting increases cumulative
per capita income for beneficiaries by greater amounts than the ‘like for like’ counterfactual
(by $341), hence the P2 measure improves with these interventions.  However, the number of
beneficiaries is very small, 55 in the case of geographic targeting.  If we consider the whole
sample the additional income is significantly less ($51). 
The results of the ‘robin hood’ targeting lie between the other two allocations.  This is
because the ‘robin hood’ allocation targets 123 beneficiaries, more than double targeted under
the geographic allocation, but provides them with less capital.  In the first two years the
results mirror the geographic targeting.  However, during the drought the results worsen,
particularly the ‘robin hood’ targeting based on the ‘snapshot’ approach where more of the
grain loan is reallocated.  Because more capital is provided to more than twice the number of
beneficiaries under the geographic targeting, and still two-thirds of the sample continue to
receive their grain loan,  the P2 measure outperforms any other counterfactual.  This
reduction in the severity of poverty, however, seems to come at the cost of penalising the top
third of households.
Thus the explanation for the difference in the counterfactual results can be split into
four parts: (1) both the ‘robin hood’ and geographically targeted interventions reach a
relatively small number of households.  Not all targeted households are lifted out of poverty
and poor households who are not recipients of assistance will obviously not be lifted out of
poverty either.  Further, the effect of some of the assistance is wasted in that it provides more
income than is necessary for some households to be lifted out of poverty; (2) in the drought
year, recipient household incomes are higher as a result of their higher capital stocks.  
However, this is achieved at the expense of some households who lose their aid, with the
result that the reduction in poverty amongst recipient households is slightly more than offset
by the increase in poverty amongst some of the non-recipients; (3) our dissavings
assumptions apply only to those households who receive aid.  It turns out that for these
households under the ‘robin hood’ and geographic targeting, only a few tend to need to
dissave in order to restore their incomes to the level we actually observe.; and (4) as a
consequence of (3), capital stock levels tend to be higher under the geographic
counterfactuals at the end of 1994/95, with the result ceteris paribus that incomes are higher
in the post-drought year that follows.  The obvious conclusion that follows from this is that
the current counterfactuals either do a poor job in targeting poor households (as in the case of
geographic (2)) or they either penalise too many households at the top of the distribution34
and/or benefit too few households at the bottom, as in the ‘robin hood’ counterfactuals.
Next we consider the second set of interventions which focus on the provision of
extension advice and, in three cases, capital equipment.  The first counterfactual considers the
provision of extension advice for households who had previously not received a visit in
1992/93.  The visits are funded by reallocating a small portion of the grain loan, the
remaining grain loan is distributed as before.  The initial impact in 1992/93 is not large which
is not surprising given only 59 households benefited from the allocation.  The effect,
however, in 1993/94 when a further 144 households receive a visit, is greater.  The P0
measure falls by 10 percent from 0.52 to 0.46.  No-one is made worse off in the drought of
1994/95, and poverty continues to fall the following year by 8 percent.  In itself this seems a
significant drop in poverty at very little expense.  Poverty falls in non-drought years and no-
one is made worse off in the drought year by simply reallocating 3 percent of the relief aid
given during the drought.
However, the impact is even greater if we combine extension advice with the
allocation of capital equipment.  Starting with the best capital counterfactual ‘like for like’
and combining this with extension advice we see even further falls in poverty  - by 7 percent
in 1992/93 and 15 percent in 1993/94.  Again, no-one is made worse off during the drought
and in fact P0 food poverty falls by 7 percent.  Poverty then falls a further 8 percent in
1995/96.  The P2 measure in 1995/96 without dissaving falls by 22 percent, and with
dissaving still falls by 15 percent.
Thus, we have the striking result that, under this counterfactual, no one is ever made
worse off in the drought year and welfare is improved in non-drought years.  On average,
each person living in a beneficiary household has an additional $Z198 (1992 $Zim) available
to her, an amount that would fund an adequate diet (defined by the expenditures necessary to
reach the food poverty line) for about six months.  A further measure of this improvement is
the number of people lifted out of food poverty.  We calculate this by multiplying the
difference between the actual and counterfactual food poverty P0 by the number of
households in the sample (370) by mean size of food poor households. This yields the
following: 130 in 1992/93; 135 in 1993/94; 99 in 1994/95; and 104 in 1995/96. 
As in the capital counterfactuals, ‘robin hood’ and geographic targeting do not appear
to be as effective as the ‘like for like’ counterfactual.  Although the geographic and ‘robin
hood’ counterfactuals see a large boost in income it is not translated into poverty reduction
because there are far fewer beneficiaries.  In terms of poverty reduction the ‘like for like’
counterfactual dominates all others for the reasons explained when comparing the capital
counterfactuals previously.
To conclude, table 14, provides a summary of the average poverty rates of the best,
worst and median counterfactuals.
Table 14:Average poverty rates for P0 and P2 of best, worst and median
counterfactuals
Average poverty rate for 1992/93-1995/96 (with dissaving)
P0             % change P2      % change
Actual Outcome 0.503                          0.128                    
Best:       6. Extension & Like for Like 0.468                      7       0.111                 13   
Median:  7.  Extension and Geographic 0.475                      6       0.124                   3   
Worst:    5.  Robin Hood (2) 0.520                     -3     0.125                   2  35
Table 15: Comparison of actual and counterfactual mean per capita incomes and household capital
stock
 % change in mean per capita income under
counterfactual, beneficiaries
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If households had previously not received an extension visit and were provided with
advice and capital stock distributed according to the same distribution as the grain loan,
average poverty would have fallen by 7 percent.  If the worst case counterfactual had been
adopted poverty would have increased by 3 percent, however, the severity of poverty would
have fallen by 2 percent.  Finally, if we took the median case, poverty as measured by P0,
would have fallen by 6 percent.36
Table 16: Comparison of actual and counterfactual consumption and food poverty (P0) estimates
P0 consumption poverty
P0 food poverty



















































































Extension and Capital Counterfactuals
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Table 17: Comparison of actual and counterfactual consumption and food poverty (P2) estimates
P2 consumption poverty
P2 food poverty
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Two conclusions emerge.  First, the provision of both extension advice and capital
equipment have the greatest impact on household incomes and the severity and incidence of
poverty in these resettlement schemes.  Second,  the most effective form of targeting appears
to be not to target at all.  The provision of untargeted aid reaches a larger population and
hence has a greater impact on reducing the incidence of poverty.  Targeted interventions reach
a small number of people who are lifted further out of poverty than is needed, hence having a
greater impact on the severity of poverty for these households.  With limited resources the
more cost-effective policy would be to improve conditions for the larger population by
reducing the overall incidence of poverty.
(iv) Qualitative method of targeting
A final targeting method is to use the results from the wealth ranking exercise.  In this set of
counterfactuals we run the actual poverty levels for the smaller sample (274) (recall only 17
of the 22 villages were included in the exercise).
Whereas the first three sets of targeting tools are applied to both the provision of
capital and extension advice, because the wealth ranking is conducted on a ‘wealth’ criteria,
the aid in these counterfactuals is given only in the form of capital equipment.
Table 18 presents results on four counterfactuals.  The actual outcome for the reduced
sample is presented first.  The results are in line with those presented for the larger sample,
although the P0 measure tends to be about 2 percentage points higher than the measure based
on the per capita income.  For comparison the first 2 counterfactuals are exactly the same
capital counterfactuals run in the previous section - ‘like for like’ and ‘robin hood’ based on
per capita income.  Again, the results are in line with those presented for the larger sample,
the ‘like for like’ counterfactual performs best.  The P0 measure falls by 7 percent.  With
dissaving only 1 percent are made worse off during the drought year.  In the following year,
1995/96, poverty declines again.
The third counterfactual takes all the grain loan allocated in 1994/95 and redistributes
it evenly amongst the bottom third of households identified as poor from the ranking
conducted by the villagers.  This reduces the P0 measure by 9 percent in both 1992/93 and in
1994/95, but dramatically increases poverty in the drought year by 14 percent.  Even with
dissaving the level of poverty remains high.  The reason for this large increase in poverty is
because all the grain loan is taken from all 1995/96 recipients and re-distributed to only 96
households.
The final counterfactual uses the ‘robin hood’ method of taking from the rich and
giving to the poor, as identified by the rankings of the villagers.  The poverty levels are
almost identical to those reported for the ‘robin hood’ counterfactual based on per capita
income, although perhaps marginally outperforming them.  Given the level of correlation
between the quantitative and qualitative rankings this is not surprising.
Similar to the previous set of other counterfactuals the direct targeting interventions,
in particular both the ‘robin hood’ counterfactuals, outperform the ‘like for like’
counterfactual on the P2 measure.  However, overall the ‘like for like’ counterfactual sees a
larger average fall in poverty as measured by the P0 measure than any other targeting
mechanism. 39
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This study has examined the consequences of alternative relief and development 
interventions on the well being of households in rural Zimbabwe.  It does so by: a)
establishing a framework that links household resources to levels of poverty; b)  validating
the quantitative data with group wealth rankings by the households in the study; c) estimating
key parameters within this framework, namely: the determinants of net crop income; the
determinants of private transfers; and the links between increased  incomes and the
accumulation of capital stock; and d) conducting a counterfactual exercise in which relief
assistance is reduced and reallocating these funds to improve access to agricultural extension
and increased holdings of capital stock.  Under these counterfactuals, the incidence and
severity of poverty in non-drought years fall significantly.  The best performing
counterfactual, improving access to extension and increasing capital stock (#7), reduces the
incidence of food poverty by 11 per cent.  Under  the most basic scenario, the increased
income generated by transforming relief aid into agricultural capital stock (the ‘like for like’
counterfactual) is sufficient to fund an adequate diet for each person in each beneficiary
household for six months.  Further, such improvements in well being are achieved without
households necessarily being made worse off during a drought year.  These results suggest
that for the households in this sample, there is a significant opportunity cost associated with
the shift in external aid resources from development to emergency assistance.
There are a number of caveats, however, that should be attached to these findings. 
First, these counterfactual results are only as robust as the assumptions that underlie them. 
These include estimates of key parameters of the simulation model - the impact of
agricultural extension and capital stock on net crop income; the absence of crowding out of
private transfers by public transfers or other household income; the relationship between
changes in crop income and additions to the capital stock - and the assumption that a
'development' transfer of capital is saved, not consumed.  For the reasons discussed in the
substantive sections of the study, a reasonable degree of confidence can be ascribed to these
estimates.  Even if one were to halve their impact, these counterfactuals would still produce a
modest improvement in household incomes (for example, a five per cent reduction in the
incidence of food poverty).   
    Second, these results pertain to only one welfare measure, income.  It could be
argued that the improvements observed here are offset by a deterioration in some other
measure of well being.  Two companion papers (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 1998a; 1998b) find
no effect of the grain loans scheme on either child (measured in terms of growth velocity of
height) or adult health  (measured in terms of BMI), suggesting that along these dimensions,
no offsetting effect will be found.  However, expressing well being in utility rather than
income/poverty terms might cause a modification of these findings.  Specifically, some
households might attach a value to the presence of public insurance as  a means of dampening
income volatility, and this is not accounted for here.
    The final caveat is the most important one.  The sample used here is a
representative sample of households resettled in three areas of Zimbabwe.  These farmers are
not typical Zimbabwean farmers, let alone typical African farmers.  In particular, these
households have, on average, been successful in accumulating assets, both as a mechanism
for accumulation and as a means of buffering income shocks.  For this reason, it would be
incorrect to use these results to argue that donors should reduce emergency spending and
redirect these funds to development assistance.  Current recipients of emergency aid
elsewhere in Africa may not have the same ability to withstand shocks; proposed recipients of41
development assistance may not be as skilled as are these farmers in using human and
physical capital to generate income.
The correct policy conclusions are twofold: a) when emergency and disaster relief
requirements increase, their funding requirements should be met by supplementing the aid
budget, not by reducing development assistance.  The current policy of funding emergency
relief by reducing development budgets is likely to have an opportunity cost in terms of
foregone poverty reduction; and b) emergency relief should provide more than merely the
means to keep people alive.  Its objective should be enhancing livelihoods, as well as
protecting lives, through the provision of physical and human capital.  By doing so, it can
reduce the need for emergency assistance in the future.
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